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a b s t r a c t
This paper presents a ‘‘two-group knapsack game’’. A number of investors colligate into two
groups to bid on a common pool of potential projects. Each investor has his/her own budget
limit and a cost estimation for undertaking each possible project. Each group represents a
power by its market share. Associated with each project, there is a potential profit that
can be realized. Investors in the same group hold an internal agreement of putting the
group’s collective interest ahead of the individual’s interest and not bidding on the same
project by more than one investor in the group. The profit of a particular project can be
wholly taken by the sole bidder or shared proportionally by two bidders in different groups
according to their group power. The objective of each group may be based not only on its
own group profit but also on the other group’s profit. Assuming that each investor acts in
a selfish manner with the best response to optimize its group’s objective subject to the
budget constraint, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists under certain conditions.
We also have some interesting findings of the ‘‘price of anarchy’’ (the ratio of theworstNash
equilibrium to the social optimum) associated with a simplified version of the two-group
knapsack game with three investors.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In a competitive market, the market power of an individual investor/company could be strengthened by allying with
other investors. Members of an allied group usually hold an internal agreement on pursuing some collective objectives
whereas eachmember controls his/her own budget. This paper presents a ‘‘two-group knapsack game"model to study their
investment strategies.
In our model, investors colligate into two groups to bid on a common pool of potential business projects. Each investor
has an individual cost base for each project to be charged against his/her own budget. Each group represents a power
by its market share. To avoid interest conflict, the members in the same group will not bid on a common project. Each
project associates with a potential profit which can be wholly taken by the sole bidder or shared proportionally by two
bidders in different groups proportional to their group powers. We assume that each investor acts in a selfish manner with
best response to optimize the group’s collective objective that may be maximizing the group’s total profit, suppressing the
opponent group’s profit, or combining both factors into consideration.
When each group represents a ‘‘super" corporationwith several ‘‘subsidiary" companies, the exercise of collective power,
collective group interests, and individual budget limit, becomes a common practice and part of the motivation of our study.
The structure of having multiple investors to receive rewards from investment subject to individual budget constraint
links to the multiple knapsack problem in literature. We refer the readers to [10,5] for some comprehensive surveys and to
[17,19] for the most recent developments on the approximation algorithms. The noncooperative nature of the investors in
selecting their potential projects (portfolios) to strengthen the group’s objective for competition makes a noncooperative
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game.Whether there exists a stable state inwhich nomembers in a single group can improve the group’s collective objective
by changing bids unilaterally leads us to the realm of Nash equilibrium [8]. Therefore, we adopt the name of ‘‘two-group
knapsack game" for our study.Wang et al. [18] presented a preliminarymodel called ‘‘two-person knapsack game’’, inwhich
only two investors are considered. It can be viewed as a special case of this work.
A Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies always exists in a game with finitely many players and finitely many strategies
[8], but there is no general result on the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium solution. Motivated by the proof of having at
least one pure Nash equilibrium solution to the congestion game [11] using the potential function method [7], Wang et al.
[18] derived some existence conditions of pure Nash equilibrium solutions to a two-person knapsack game. They show that
it is NP-hard to find a pure Nash equilibrium solution for a two-person knapsack game [18]. Therefore, it remains NP-hard
for the general model, two-group knapsack game.
When pure Nash equilibrium solutions exist under certain conditions, the noncooperative nature of the game and the
selfish manner of each investor may prevail at the sacrifice of the social welfare. In order to study the impact of investment
decisions to the whole society, we quantify pure Nash equilibrium solutions in a simplified two-group knapsack game with
three players, by the concept of ‘‘price of anarchy" [6], which is defined as the ratio of the worst Nash equilibrium to the
social optimum. This concept has been a key content in the algorithmic game theory [9] and has been adopted inmany fields
including the problems of traffic routing [13,14,12], load balancing [6,3,2,16], facility location [15], and network design [1,4].
If it is not specially mentioned, a Nash equilibrium means a pure Nash equilibrium solution in this paper. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. The model and notations of the two-group knapsack game are given in Section 2. The
existence conditions of Nash equilibrium are also presented in this section. The concept of the price of anarchy is employed
and analyzed for some simplified two-group knapsack games in Section 3. Concluding remarks and future research are
included in Section 4.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Model and notations
The two-group knapsack game can be stated as follows. Suppose that there exist m investors (say, player j for j =
1, 2, . . . ,m) bidding on n potential projects (say, project k for k = 1, 2, . . . , n). There associates a potential profit with
each of the projects (say, pk for project k, k = 1, 2, . . . , n), while an individual budget limit is associated with each player
(say, cj for player j, j = 1, 2, ...,m). To include a specific project k in player j’s portfolio, there associates a cost wjk for the
player. The players colligate into two groups (say, group t for t = 1, 2). Assume that the first group has l (l < m) players (say,
players 1, 2, . . . , l) and the rest of the players belong to group 2. Remember that players in the same group do not bid on
any common project. If a player of a particular group is the sole bidder of project k, the profit pk will go to the player (hence
to his/her group) in whole. If two players in different groups both select project k, then the profit pk will be shared by them
(actually their groups) in proportion to themarket power of each group. Here we assume that (1−αt)pk goes to the investor
in group t , t = 1, 2, where 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1. Note that α1 + α2 = 1 is NOT assumed here, because the presence of multiple
noncooperative players may either stimulate new demands for a bigger market or reduce the total needs for the market.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that cj, pk and wjk are nonnegative integers for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let Sj be the set of projects selected by player j for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. A state of the two-group knapsack
game can be described as an ordered pair (G1,G2), where G1 = (S1, . . . , Sl), G2 = (Sl+1, . . . , Sm) with Si, Sj being disjoint
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l or l + 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Let w(Sj) be the total cost for player j to undertake all projects in set Sj. We say a state
(G1,G2) is feasible if and only if w(Sj) ≤ cj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. For a given feasible state (G1,G2), let Pt(G1,G2) be the total
profit awarded to the players in group t , t = 1, 2, at this state. Without much confusion, we also use Gt to denote the set of
projects chosen by all players in group t , t = 1, 2. Then it is not difficult to verify that
P1(G1,G2)= p(G1)− α1p(G1 ∩ G2),
P2(G1,G2)= p(G2)− α2p(G1 ∩ G2), (1)
where p(G) represents the total profits of the projects in set G.
In this paper, the objective function of each group is assumed to be a linear combination of the profits of both groups. To
be more specific, the objective value of group t at state (G1,G2) is given by
Ot(G1,G2) = βttPt(G1,G2)− βtsPs(G1,G2), (2)
where t, s = 1, 2, t 6= s, βtt ≥ 0 and βts ∈ R.
The nonnegativity of βtt indicates that both groups value their own profits positively. When βts = 0, group t minds only
his/her own profit. When βts > 0, group t is concerned about the weighted gap between his/her profit and the opponent’s.
Whenβts < 0, group t is interested in theweighted total obtainable profits for both groups. In the latter case,we assume that
βtt > −βts to indicate that group t minds his/her own profit more than the opponent’s. Substituting (1) into the objectives
functions, we have
O1(G1,G2)= β11p(G1)− β12p(G2)−∆1p(G1 ∩ G2)
O2(G1,G2)= β22p(G2)− β21p(G1)−∆2p(G1 ∩ G2), (3)
where∆t = αtβtt − αsβts, for t, s = 1, 2 and t 6= s.
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A state of the knapsack game is called aNash equilibrium if it is a feasible state atwhich no group can improve its objective
value by changing its portfolio unilaterally. A formal definition is given below.
Definition 1. A feasible state (G1,G2) is a Nash equilibrium of the two-group knapsack game if and only if O1(G1,G2) ≥
O1(G′1,G2) and O2(G1,G2) ≥ O2(G1,G′2) for any feasible states (G′1,G2) and (G1,G′2).
2.2. Existence of Nash equilibrium
Motivated by the potential function method [7] and the work of Wang et al. [18], we present an existence condition of
pure Nash equilibrium for the two-group knapsack game.
Definition 2. For a two-group knapsack game, the potential function of the game is a real valued function defined over the
set of feasible states such that its value increases strictlywhen any group shifts to a newstate for an improvedobjective value.
If∆1∆2 ≥ 0 for the two-group knapsack game, we may define a functionΦ with respect to the feasible state (G1,G2) of
this game:
Φ(G1,G2) =

p(G1)+ p(G2), if∆1 = ∆2 = 0
Mp(G1)+ β22p(G2)−∆2p(G1 ∩ G2), if∆1 = 0 and ∆2 6= 0
Mp(G2)+ β11p(G1)−∆1p(G1 ∩ G2), if∆1 6= 0 and∆2 = 0
∆2β11p(G1)+∆1β22p(G2)−∆1∆2p(G1 ∩ G2), if∆1 > 0 and∆2 > 0
−∆2β11p(G1)−∆1β22p(G2)+∆1∆2p(G1 ∩ G2), if∆1 < 0 and∆2 < 0
(4)
whereM = max{|∆1|, |∆2|}∑nk=1 pk + 1.
Following similar arguments presented in [18], we can verify that Φ(G1,G2) is indeed a potential function of the two-
group knapsack game (detailed proof is given in the Appendix). It is well known that a pure Nash equilibrium solution exists
for a game with finitely many feasible states if there associates a potential function with the game. Therefore, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. If∆1∆2 ≥ 0 for the two-group knapsack game, then there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 1 presents a sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium, but it is not a necessary condition.
Consider a simple example with only one project, two players, and the following parameters: p1 = 1, wj1 = cj for j = 1, 2,
α1 = 1/3, α2 = 2/3, βij = 1 for i, j = 1, 2. We calculate that ∆1 = −1/3, ∆2 = 1/3 and ∆1∆2 < 0. There are four
feasible states, say (∅,∅), (∅, {1}), ({1},∅) and ({1}, {1}), with objectives (0, 0), (−1, 1), (1,−1), (1/3,−1/3) respectively.
The state ({1}, {1}) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, we show that there exists at least one instance without pure Nash equilibrium if∆1∆2 < 0. Consider
the instances such that the cost of project k satisfies wjk > cj for j = 2, . . . , l, l + 2, . . . ,m, i.e., only the first player of
each group (say, player 1 and player l + 1) can select projects. It is indeed a two-person knapsack game. Wang et al. [18]
constructed an instance without pure Nash equilibrium for any two-person knapsack game with ∆1∆2 < 0. We adopt
the instance with two projects such that p1 = p2 = 1, w11 = w12 = c1, wl+1,1 = wl+1,2 = cl+1, and wjk > cj for
k = 1, 2, j = 2, . . . , l, l+ 2, . . . ,m, and then following similar arguments presented in [18], we can verify that any feasible
state is not Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If∆1∆2 < 0 for the two-group knapsack game, then there exists at least one instancewithout pure Nash equilibrium.
3. Price of anarchy
The rest of our work is to adopt the concept of price of anarchy [6] to quantify the Nash equilibrium solutions to a
simplified version of the two-group knapsack game.
In this section, the following assumptions are made to simplify our analysis. (i) Only three players are considered, two of
them, say players 1 and 2 (without loss of generality, c1 ≥ c2) form group 1 and player 3 forms group 2 by himself/herself.
(ii) The profit is equally shared if both groups select the same project, i.e., α1 = α2 = 1/2. (iii) The two groups have the
same objective, either to maximize the gap between its profit and the opponent’s, i.e., βtt = 1, βts = 1 in (2), or to maximize
its own profit, i.e., βtt = 1, βts = 0 in (2). (iv) The cost of selecting project k is the same for all players, i.e., wjk = wk for
k = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, 3.
Some observations can be made here. First, with the assumption (i), we have G1 = (S1, S2) and G2 = (S3). Second, by the
assumption (ii), the profit of each group at a feasible state (G1,G2) becomes
P1(G1,G2)= p(G1)− 12p(G1 ∩ G2),
P2(G1,G2)= p(G2)− 12p(G1 ∩ G2).
(5)
The total profit of the two groups becomes
p(G1 ∪ G2) = P1(G1,G2)+ P2(G1,G2) = p(G1)+ p(G2)− p(G1 ∩ G2). (6)
Third, the assumption (iii) considers two scenarios, namely,
(P1(G1,G2)− P2(G1,G2), P2(G1,G2)− P1(G1,G2))
Z. Wang et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1094–1103 1097
and
(P1(G1,G2), P2(G1,G2)).
We call the corresponding games a ‘‘competitive two-group knapsack game" and a ‘‘selfish two-group knapsack game’’,
respectively. Fourth, with the assumptions (ii) and (iii), for each of the two games, it is easy to verify that ∆t ≥ 0,
t = 1, 2. Hence a pure Nash equilibrium exists for each case by Theorem 1. We denote a pure Nash equilibrium solution by
(G∗1,G
∗
2) = ((S∗1 , S∗2 ), S∗3 ) throughout the paper. If we let z∗ be the total profit of two groups at the state (G∗1,G∗2), then
z∗ = p(G∗1 ∪ G∗2) = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (7)
We shall quantify the Nash equilibria by the concept of price of anarchy, which is defined to be the ratio of the worst
total profit associated with a Nash equilibrium to the social optimum. Here the social optimum is defined to be a feasible
state (G¯1, G¯2) = ((S¯1, S¯2), S¯3) that achieves the maximum total profit z¯ of the two groups. Notice that if there is a project
belonging to S¯i ∩ S¯j for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j, because of the assumption (ii), we can always remove this project from
one player’s selection list to get a new feasible state without changing the maximum profit. Therefore, we may in general
assume that S¯i ∩ S¯j = ∅ for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j. Consequently, we have G¯1 ∩ G¯2 = ∅ and
z¯ = p(G¯1 ∪ G¯2) = p(G¯1)+ p(G¯2) = p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2)+ p(S¯3). (8)
The following two subsections will analyze the price of anarchy for the ‘‘competitive two-group knapsack game" and
‘‘selfish two-group knapsack game" respectively.
3.1. Competitive two-group knapsack game
Remember that in the following analysis, c1 ≥ c2 is assumed without loss of generality, (G∗1,G∗2) is a Nash equilibrium,
and (G¯1, G¯2) is a social optimum.
Theorem 3. If c2 < c3, the price of anarchy is 1/2 for the competitive two-group knapsack game.
Proof. Since (G∗1,G
∗
2) and (G¯1, G¯2) are feasible, so are (G¯1,G
∗
2) and (G
∗
1, G¯2). From the definitions of Nash equilibrium
and competitive two-group knapsack game, we know that P1(G∗1,G
∗
2) − P2(G∗1,G∗2) ≥ P1(G¯1,G∗2) − P2(G¯1,G∗2) and
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2) − P1(G∗1,G∗2) ≥ P2(G∗1, G¯2) − P1(G∗1, G¯2). Therefore, from (5), we have p(G∗1) ≥ p(G¯1) and p(G∗2) ≥ p(G¯2).
Noticing that P1(G∗1,G
∗
2) = p(G∗1) − 12p(G∗1 ∪ G∗2) and p(G∗1 ∪ G∗2) ≤ p(G∗1), we have P1(G∗1,G∗2) ≥ 12p(G∗1). Similarly we
have P2(G∗1,G
∗
2) ≥ 12p(G∗2). Therefore,
z∗ = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2)
≥ 1
2
(p(G∗1)+ p(G∗2)) ≥
1
2
(p(G¯1)+ p(G¯2)) = 12 z¯.
Next, we use an instance to show the bound is tight by assuming that c3 ≤ c1. A similar instance can be constructed for
the case of c3 > c1.
Instance 1. There are two projects. For project 1, w1 = c3 and p1 = 1+  where  > 0. For project 2, w2 = c1 and p2 = 1.
The feasible state (({1}, {∅}), {1}) is a Nash equilibriumwith z∗ = 1+ , and the feasible state (({2}, {∅}), {1}) achieves the
social optimum with z¯ = 2+ . Since z∗/z¯ → 1/2 when  → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight. 
Theorem 4. If c2 ≥ c3, the price of anarchy is 2/3 for the competitive two-group knapsack game.
Proof. Since G¯1 = (S¯1, S¯2), we know that the state ((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2) is feasible. From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and
competitive two-group knapsack game, we know that P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)−P2(G∗1,G∗2) ≥ P1((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2)−P2((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2). Noticing
that P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)− P2(G∗1,G∗2) = p(G∗1)− p(G∗2) and P1((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2)− P2((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2) = p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2)− p(G∗2), we have
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2) ≤ p(G∗1). (9)
As c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3, the states ((S¯1, S¯3),G∗2) and ((S¯2, S¯3),G∗2) are all feasible. Similarly, we have
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯3) ≤ p(G∗1), (10)
p(S¯2)+ p(S¯3) ≤ p(G∗1). (11)
Combining (9), (10) and (11), we have 2z¯ ≤ 3p(G∗1). Noticing that p(G∗1) ≤ z∗, we have z∗ ≥ 23 z¯.
The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 2. The information of projects is described in Table 1 where  > 0.
The feasible state (({3}, {1}), {1}) is a Nash equilibriumwith z∗ = 2+ while the feasible state (({3}, {2}), {1}) achieves
the social optimum with z¯ = 3+ . Since z∗/z¯ → 2/3 when  → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight. 
3.2. Selfish two-group knapsack game
Theorem 5. If c2 < c3, the price of anarchy is 2/3 for the selfish two-group knapsack game.
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Table 1
Information of items in
Instance 2.
Project j 1 2 3
wj c3 c2 c1
pj 1+  1 1
Proof. Since the states (G∗1,G
∗
2) and (G¯1, G¯2) are feasible, so are the states (G¯1,G
∗
2) and (G
∗
1, G¯2). From the definitions of Nash
equilibriumand selfish two-group knapsack game,we know that P1(G∗1,G
∗
2) ≥ P1(G¯1,G∗2) and P2(G∗1,G∗2) ≥ P2(G∗1, G¯2). From
(5), we have P1(G¯1,G∗2) = p(G¯1)− 12p(G¯1 ∩ G∗2) and P2(G∗1, G¯2) = p(G¯2)− 12p(G∗1 ∩ G¯2). Therefore,
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2) ≥ p(G¯1)+ p(G¯2)−
1
2
[p(G¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(G∗1 ∩ G¯2)]. (12)
As the social optimal state (G¯1, G¯2) satisfies that G¯1 ∩ G¯2 = ∅, we know (G¯1 ∩ G∗2) ∩ (G∗1 ∩ G¯2) = ∅. Therefore, we have
p(G¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(G∗1 ∩ G¯2) = p((G¯1 ∩ G∗2) ∪ (G∗1 ∩ G¯2))
≤ p(G∗1 ∪ G∗2) = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we have
3
2
[P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2)] ≥ p(G¯1)+ p(G¯2),
which indicates that z∗ ≥ 23 z¯.
The following instance shows the bound is tight. Here we assume that c3 ≤ c1, and a similar instance can be constructed
for the case of c3 > c1.
Instance 3. There are two projects. For project 1, w1 = c3 and p1 = 2+  where  > 0. For project 2, w2 = c1 and p2 = 1.
The feasible state (({1}, {∅}), {1}) is a Nash equilibriumwith z∗ = 2+ , and the feasible state (({2}, {∅}), {1}) achieves the
social optimum with z¯ = 3+ . Since z∗/z¯ → 2/3 when  → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight. 
We discuss the case of c2 ≥ c3 under four subcases: c3 < c2 < 2c3, c1 = c2 = c3, c1 > c2 = c3 and c2 ≥ 2c3. It is easy to
see that our discussions cover all possibilities.
Theorem 6. If c3 < c2 < 2c3, the price of anarchy is 5/7 for the selfish two-group knapsack game.
Proof. It is easy to see that ((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2) is a feasible state. From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and selfish two-group
knapsack game, we know P1(G∗1,G
∗
2) ≥ P1((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2). From (5), we have p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2) + 12p((S¯1 ∪ S¯2) ∩ G∗2).
Noticing that p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2) = p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2) and p((S¯1 ∪ S¯2) ∩ G∗2) = p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2), we have
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+
1
2
p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2). (14)
Since c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3, we know that ((S¯1, S¯3),G∗2) and ((S¯2, S¯3),G∗2) are feasible states.With a similar discussion of obtaining
(14), we have
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯3) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+
1
2
p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2), (15)
p(S¯2)+ p(S¯3) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2)+
1
2
p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2). (16)
Combining (14), (15) and (16), we have
z¯ ≤ 3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+
1
2
(p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2)). (17)
Since S¯i ∩ S¯j = ∅, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j, we have
p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2) ≤ p(G∗2) ≤ 2P2(G∗1,G∗2). (18)
From (17) and (18), we have
z¯ ≤ 3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (19)
On the other hand, from (14), we have
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(G∗2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (20)
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Table 2
Information of items in Instance 4.
Project j 1 2 3 4
wj c3 −  c3 c1 c2 − c3 + 
pj 2+  2 2 1
Since the state (G∗1, S¯3) is feasible, we know P2(G
∗
1, S¯3) ≤ P2(G∗1,G∗2). Noticing that p(S¯3) ≤ 2P2(G∗1, S¯3), we have,
p(S¯3) ≤ 2P2(G∗1,G∗2). (21)
From (20) and (21), we have
z¯ ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ 3P2(G∗1,G∗2). (22)
From (19) and (22), we have
z∗ = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P1(G∗1,G∗2)
= 4
7
(
3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2)
)
+ 1
7
(P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ 3P2(G∗1,G∗2))
≥ 5
7
z¯.
The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 4. The information of projects is described in Table 2 with  > 0 being a sufficiently small number.
We can verify that the feasible state (({2}, {1 ∪ 4}), {1}) is a Nash equilibrium with z∗ = 5 + , and the feasible state
(({3}, {1 ∪ 4}), {2}) achieves the social optimum with z¯ = 7 + . Since z∗/z¯ → 5/7 when  → 0 for this instance, the
bound is tight. 
Theorem 7. If c1 = c2 = c3, the price of anarchy is 14/19 for the selfish two-group knapsack game.
Proof. It is easy to see that the state (G∗1, S¯1) is feasible as c1 = c2 = c3. From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and selfish
two-group knapsack game, we know that P2(G∗1,G
∗
2) ≥ P2(G∗1, S¯1). From (5), we have
p(S¯1) ≤ P2(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(G∗1 ∩ S¯1). (23)
Since c2 = c3, we can similarly obtain that
p(S¯2) ≤ P2(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(G∗1 ∩ S¯2), (24)
p(S¯3) ≤ P2(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
p(G∗1 ∩ S¯3). (25)
Combining these results, we have
z¯ ≤ 3P2(G∗1,G∗2)+
1
2
(p(G∗1 ∩ S¯1)+ p(G∗1 ∩ S¯2)+ p(G∗1 ∩ S¯3)).
We have assumed that S¯i ∩ S¯j = ∅, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j, thus p(G∗1 ∩ S¯1) + p(G∗1 ∩ S¯2) + p(G∗1 ∩ S¯3) ≤ p(G∗1) ≤
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). Consequently, we have
z¯ ≤ 1
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+
7
2
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2). (26)
Noticing that (19) holds for c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3, we have
z¯ ≤ 3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (27)
Combining (26) and (27), we have
z∗ = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P1(G∗1,G∗2)
= 2
19
(
1
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+
7
2
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2)
)
+ 12
19
(
3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2)
)
≥ 14
19
z¯.
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Table 3
Information of items in Instance 5.
Project j 1 2 3 4 5 6
wj
1
2 c1 +  12 c1 − 2 12 c1 −  12 c1 12 c1 + 2 12 c1
pj 3+  1+  1 2 32 1
Table 4
Information of items in Instance 6.
Project j 1, 2 3, 4 5
wj
1
3 c2 −  23 c2 +  c1
pj 2+  2 3
The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 5. The information of projects is described in Table 3 with  > 0 being a sufficiently small number.
It can be verified that the feasible state (({1 ∪ 2}, {3 ∪ 4}), {1 ∪ 2}) is a Nash equilibrium with z∗ = 7 + 2, and the
feasible state (({1∪ 3}, {2∪ 5}), {4∪ 6}) achieves the social optimumwith z¯ = 192 + 2. Since z∗/z¯ → 14/19 when  → 0
for this instance, the bound is tight. 
Theorem 8. If c1 > c2 = c3, the price of anarchy is 8/11 for the selfish two-group knapsack game.
Proof. Notice that (14) and (15) hold for c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3. Therefore, we have
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯2)≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ 12p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ 12p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2),
p(S¯1)+ p(S¯3)≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ 12p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ 12p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2).
(28)
Since (24) and (25) hold for c2 = c3, we have
p(S¯2) ≤ P2(G∗1,G∗2)+ 12p(G∗1 ∩ S¯2)
p(S¯3) ≤ P2(G∗1,G∗2)+ 12p(G∗1 ∩ S¯3).
(29)
We have assumed that S¯i ∩ S¯j = ∅, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j, therefore,
p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯2 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2)≤ p(G∗2) ≤ 2P2(G∗1,G∗2)
p(S¯1 ∩ G∗2)+ p(G∗1 ∩ S¯2)+ p(G∗1 ∩ S¯3)≤ p(G∗1 ∪ G∗2) = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (30)
Combining (28), (29) and (30), we have
z¯ ≤ 5
4
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+
7
4
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2). (31)
Noticing that (19) holds for c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3, we have
z¯ ≤ 3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2). (32)
Combining(31) and (32), we have
z∗ = P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ P1(G∗1,G∗2)
= 4
11
(
5
4
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+
7
4
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2)
)
+ 4
11
(
3
2
P1(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ P2(G∗1,G∗2)
)
≥ 8
11
z¯.
The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 6. The information of projects is described in Table 4 with  > 0 being sufficiently small.
It can be verified that the feasible state (({1, 3}, {2, 4}), {1, 2}) is a Nash equilibrium with z∗ = 8+ 2, and the feasible
state (({5}, {1, 3}), {2, 4}) achieves the social optimumwith z¯ = 11+2. Since z∗/z¯ → 8/11when  → 0 for this instance,
the bound is tight. 
Theorem 9. If c2 ≥ 2c3, the price of anarchy is 3/4 for the selfish two-group knapsack game.
Proof. Since c2 ≥ 2c3, we have w(G∗2 ∪ S¯3) ≤ c2, and thus ((S¯1 \ G∗2,G∗2 ∪ S¯3),G∗2) is a feasible state. From the definitions
of Nash equilibrium and selfish two-group knapsack game, we know that P1((S¯1 \ G∗2,G∗2 ∪ S¯3),G∗2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2). From (5),
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we have
p(S¯1 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2)−
1
2
p(G∗2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2). (33)
Similarly, the state ((S¯2 \ G∗2,G∗2 ∪ S¯3),G∗2) is also feasible, and then
p(S¯2 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2)−
1
2
p(G∗2) ≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2). (34)
As S¯i ∩ S¯j = ∅ for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j, it is easy to verify that
p(S¯1 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2)+ p(S¯2 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2) = p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 ∪ G∗2)
= p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2)+ p(G∗2)+ p(S¯3 \ G∗2).
Together with (33) and (34), we have
p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 \ G∗2) ≤ 2P1(G∗1,G∗2).
Since p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3 ∪ G∗2) ≥ p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3) = z¯, we have
z¯ ≤ 2P1(G∗1,G∗2)− p(S¯3 \ G∗2). (35)
Let p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2) = λP2(G∗1,G∗2), then 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2. Since p((S¯1 ∪ S¯2) ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2) = p((S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3) ∩ G∗2) ≤ p(G∗2) and
p(G∗2) ≤ 2P2(G∗1,G∗2), we have
p((S¯1 ∪ S¯2) ∩ G∗2) ≤ p(G∗2)− p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2)
≤ (2− λ)P2(G∗1,G∗2).
It is easy to see that ((S¯1, S¯2),G∗2) is a feasible state. We have
p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2)≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ 12p((S¯1 ∪ S¯2) ∩ G∗2)≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ (1− 12λ)P2(G∗1,G∗2).
(36)
Hence we have
z¯ = p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2 ∪ S¯3)
= p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2)+ p(S¯3 ∩ G∗2)+ p(S¯3 \ G∗2)≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
(
1+ 12λ
)
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ p(S¯3 \ G∗2).
(37)
Combining (35) and (37) to eliminate p(S¯3 \ G∗2), we have
2z¯ ≤ 3P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
(
1+ 1
2
λ
)
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2). (38)
On the other hand, noticing that p(S¯3) ≤ 2P2(G∗1, S¯3) ≤ 2P2(G∗1,G∗2), together with (36), we have
z¯ = p(S¯1 ∪ S¯2)+ p(S¯3)
≤ P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
(
1− 1
2
λ
)
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2)+ 2P2(G∗1,G∗2)
= P1(G∗1,G∗2)+
(
3− 1
2
λ
)
P2(G∗1,G
∗
2). (39)
Combining (38) and (39) to eliminate λ, we have
3z¯ ≤ 4P1(G∗1,G∗2)+ 4P2(G∗1,G∗2) = 4z∗.
Consequently, we obtain the desired result that z∗ ≥ 34 z¯. The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 7. The information of projects is described in Table 5 with  > 0 being sufficiently small.
It can be verified that the feasible state (({2}, {1}), {1}) is a Nash equilibrium with z∗ = 3 + , and the feasible state
(({2}, {3}), {1}) achieves the social optimum with z¯ = 4 + . Since z∗/z¯ → 3/4 when  → 0 for this instance, the bound
is tight. 
4. Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced a new model called the two-group knapsack game, which is flexible to accommodate some
interesting scenarios for real-life applications. We have shown that a pure Nash equilibrium solution exists under certain
conditions. We have also investigated the price of anarchy associated with two simplified two-group knapsack games.
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Table 5
Information of items in
Instance 7.
Project j 1 2 3
wj c3 c1 c2
pj 2+  1 1
Table 6
The price of anarchy for the selfish
two-group knapsack game.
Cases Price of anarchy
c2 < c3 23 ≈ 0.667
c3 < c2 < 2c3 57 ≈ 0.714
c1 > c2 = c3 811 ≈ 0.727
c1 = c2 = c3 1419 ≈ 0.737
c1 ≥ c2 ≥ 2c3 34 = 0.75
The price of anarchy analysis has illustrated some potential reductions of social welfare due to specific economic
behaviors of different business groups. In our simplified two-group knapsack game, only three players are considered: two
(with budgets c1 and c2, and c1 ≥ c2) of them are in the first group, and the third player (with budgets c3) forms the second
group by himself/herself. For the ‘‘competitive two-group knapsack game," the price of anarchy is 1/2 if c2 < c3 and 2/3 if
c2 ≥ c3. For the ‘‘selfish two-group knapsack game’’, the price of anarchy is sensitive to the budgets of players, and Table 6
summarizes our findings in which c1 ≥ c2 is generally assumed.
It is interesting to note that, for a game with three players, no matter the game is competitive or selfish, the worst price
of anarchy (1/2 for the competitive game and 2/3 for the selfish game) happens when the player with the least budget
colligates with another player to form a group. Therefore, from the social welfare point view, it may be better to leave the
player with the least budget alone forming a group by himself/herself. In other words, inducing the two players with higher
budgets to ally together avoiding their internal fights could result in a higher level of total social profit. This is particularly
true when their budgets are high enough (c1 ≥ c2 ≥ 2c3) in a selfish two-group knapsack game. The price of anarchy
archives the best case at 3/4.
Our results bring up a new model with many subjects for further investigation. For example, when each group has a
different objective function (mixed game of selfish and competitive) or there are two players in each group, how does one
conduct the price of anarchy analysis?
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Appendix.Φ(G1,G2) defined in (4) is potential function
Proof. 1. If∆1 = ∆2 = 0, Eq. (3) becomes
O1(G1,G2) = β11p(G1)− β12p(G2),
O2(G1,G2) = β22p(G2)− β21p(G1).
Let Φ(G1,G2) = p(G1) + p(G2). If there is any group, assumed to be group 1 without loss of generality, can improve its
objective by shifting to a feasible state G′1, then O1(G1,G2) < O1(G
′
1,G2). Consequently, we have β11p(G1) < β11p(G
′
1). Since
β11 ≥ 0 is generally assumed, we know p(G1) < p(G′1), which implies thatΦ(G1,G2) < Φ(G′1,G2). Therefore,Φ(G1,G2) is
a potential function for this case from Definition 2.
2. If∆1 = 0 and∆2 6= 0, letΦ(G1,G2) = Mp(G1)+β22p(G2)−∆2p(G1∩G2), whereM = max{|∆1|, |∆2|}∑nk=1 pk+1;
if∆1 6= 0 and∆2 = 0, then letΦ(G1,G2) = Mp(G2)+ β11p(G1)−∆1p(G1 ∩ G2).
For the case∆1 = 0 and∆2 6= 0, we have
O1(G1,G2) = β11p(G1)− β12p(G2),
O2(G1,G2) = β22p(G2)− β21p(G1)−∆2p(G1 ∩ G2).
If group 1 can change to a feasible state G′1 for an improved objective value, then O1(G1,G2) < O1(G
′
1,G2). Consequently,
we have p(G1) < p(G′1). As we have generally assumed that pk is a positive integer, we know p(G
′
1) ≥ p(G1) + 1. Noticing
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that
Φ2(G1,G2) = Mp(G1)+ β22p(G2)−∆2p(G1 ∩ G2),
Φ2(G′1,G2) = Mp(G′1)+ β22p(G2)−∆2p(G′1 ∩ G2),
andM = max{|∆1|, |∆2|}∑nk=1 pk + 1 > 0, we have
Φ(G′1,G2)− Φ(G1,G2) = M(p(G′1)− p(G1))−∆2(p(G′1 ∩ G2)− p(G1 ∩ G2))
≥ M − |∆2|
n∑
k=1
pk > 0.
Now, if group 2 obtains an improved objective value by changing from G2 to G′2, then O2(G1,G2) < O2(G1,G
′
2). This
further implies that β22p(G2) − ∆2p(G1 ∩ G2) < β22p(G′2) − ∆2p(G1 ∩ G′2). Therefore, we have Φ2(G1,G2) < Φ2(G1,G′2),
andΦ(G1,G2) is a potential function for this case from Definition 2. A similar proof follows for the case∆1 6= 0 and∆2 = 0.
3. If∆1 > 0 and∆2 > 0, letΦ(G1,G2) = ∆2β11p(G1)+∆1β22p(G2)−∆1∆2p(G1 ∩ G2).
If group 1 changes from G1 to a feasible state G′1 with an improved objective value, then O1(G1,G2) < O1(G
′
1,G2). Eq. (3)
implies that
β11p(G1)−∆1p(G1 ∩ G2) < β11p(G′1)−∆1p(G′1 ∩ G2).
Since∆2 > 0, we have
Φ(G′1,G2)− Φ(G1,G2) = ∆2[(β11p(G′1)−∆1p(G′1 ∩ G2))− (β11p(G1)−∆1p(G1 ∩ G2))] > 0.
A similar proof follows if group 2 improves his objective value by changing its state. Hence Φ(G1,G2) is a potential
function for this case from Definition 2.
4. If∆1 < 0 and∆2 < 0, let Φ(G1,G2) = −∆2β11p(G1)− ∆1β22p(G2)+ ∆1∆2p(G1 ∩ G2). With the same argument in
the case 3, by noticing the fact that∆1 < 0 and∆2 < 0, we can easily construct a proof to show thatΦ(G1,G2) is a potential
function for this case. 
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